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Stability and change in personal fertility ideals among
US women in heterosexual relationships
Colleen M. Ray1
Sela R. Harcey2
Arthur L. Greil3
Stacy Tiemeyer4
Julia McQuillan2

Abstract
BACKGROUND
Demographers typically ask about societal, not personal, fertility ideals. Societal ideals
are probably more stable than personal ideals. Assessing whether personal fertility
ideals are as stable as societal ideals could inform models of population fertility change
and models of well-being associated with fertility outcomes.
METHODS
We use the two-wave National Survey of Fertility Barriers (NSFB) to model stability
and change in fertility ideals among 879 women in heterosexual couples that persisted
for both waves.
RESULTS
Personal fertility ideals are stable for most (69%) women, but roughly one-third adjust
their ideal number between waves. Of the women who changed their personal fertility
ideal, approximately half increase and half decrease their personal fertility ideal over
time. Multinomial logistic regression indicates that women with a higher fertility ideal
at Wave 1 had higher odds of increasing and lower odds of decreasing their fertility
ideal by Wave 2. Higher education was associated with lower likelihood of increasing
fertility ideals. In addition, full-time employment at the initial interview was associated
with higher likelihood of decreasing fertility ideals.
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CONCLUSIONS
Individual characteristics, attitudes, life course, and social cues are associated with
changes in personal fertility ideals. More characteristics were associated with decreases
than increases in personal fertility ideals.
CONTRIBUTIONS
By demonstrating that many women change personal fertility ideals over three years,
the current study advances understanding of variations in fertility experiences.
Importantly, these findings can also inform policies and interventions designed to
support child and maternal health.

1. Introduction
Nearly four decades after reliable, affordable, and accessible birth control and legal
abortion became available, the persistence of unrealized fertility ideals raises practical
and theoretical questions about individual, cultural, social, and policy factors that
contribute to individual and population level fertility (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011). In
many countries, fertility rates have declined to historically low levels (1.3 in Japan, 1.5
in Germany) (Billari and Kohler 2004; Boling 2008). The United States is unusual
because it is highly developed and has maintained a somewhat high fertility rate (1.86)
(Livingston 2018). Relatively low levels of fertility in developed nations have prompted
some demographers to ask whether contemporary fertility behavior reflects individual
preferences for few or no children, or whether there is a “fertility gap” (Chesnais 2000)
that indicates lower achieved than desired fertility (Philipov et al. 2009).
Demographers tend to assume that living in a context in which people have access
to contraceptive methods is associated with achieved fertility desires. Studies of fertility
desires usually focus on the immediate time horizon and do not ask respondents to
imagine what they would want under ideal conditions. Despite burgeoning research on
fertility intentions (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011), only recently have demographers
focused on fertility ideals (i.e., ideal family size or ideal number of children) (Philipov
and Bernardi 2012). Evidence from longitudinal German data that individuals
sometimes revise fertility ideals (Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson 2008) suggests the
value of not assuming, but instead assessing, stability and change in fertility ideals. In
this paper we explore two focal questions: (1) In the United States, what proportion of
women in stable heterosexual unions change their personal fertility ideal over
approximately three years? (2) Are individual characteristics, attitudes, life course, and
social cues associated with changes in personal fertility ideals?
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In the current study, we measure fertility ideals by using a question about personal
ideal number of children regardless of the number of children individuals have now or
intend in the future. We answer the questions above by examining a subset of women in
heterosexual unions who participated in both waves of the NSFB (2004 to 2006 and
2007 to 2010), a representative sample of women ages 25–45 in the United States. We
find that personal fertility ideals are stable for most (69%) women but that roughly onethird adjust their ideal number between waves. Of the women who changed their
fertility ideals, approximately half increase and half decrease their fertility ideal over
time. Multinomial logistic regression of the odds of an increasing or decreasing fertility
ideal over time indicates that individual characteristics, attitudes, life course indicators,
and social cues are associated with changes in fertility ideals.

2. Theoretical and empirical background
2.1 Intentions, ideals, and desires
Philipov and Bernardi (2012) have used the term “hypothetical fertility” to refer to a
wide range of related concepts, including fertility ideals, fertility intentions, fertility
desires, fertility expectations, and fertility aspirations. What all these concepts have in
common is a concern with fertility outcomes that have not yet occurred and may never
occur. Because fertility behavior usually involves a certain degree of planning, some
demographers have argued that fertility intentions, ideals, desires, etc. are an important
component of any theoretical model of human fertility (Coale 1973; van de Walle
1992). What these terms actually mean and how to distinguish one from another,
however, is not always clear. Fertility intentions are usually understood to be proximate
causes of fertility behavior (Ajzen and Klobas 2013; Trent 1980), and desires,
preferences, and ideals are generally conceptualized as more distal (Hin et al. 2011;
Miller 1994, 2011; Miller, Severy, and Pasta 2004). Fertility expectations and fertility
aspirations have been used as more generic terms that can refer to fertility ideals and/or
fertility intentions (Hayford 2009).
Because of persistent and fairly high rates of unintended pregnancies in the United
States, there has been considerable attention to understanding fertility intentions (e.g.,
Mumford et al. 2016). Personal fertility ideals, although related to fertility intentions,
capture unique dimensions of fertility such as early life goals and later life adjustments
to realized parity. Fertility intentions are usually conceptualized as concrete plans to
have a child that take into account the perceived costs and benefits of having a child at a
certain point in time (Trent 1980). A great deal of evidence suggests that fertility
intentions are best understood – not as relatively stable traits – but as “moving targets”
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(Lee 1980; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003) that can change rapidly and dramatically
depending on social context. Although fertility intentions do not provide consistent
predictions of achieved fertility at either the individual or aggregate level (Morgan and
King 2001; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003), intentions have strong associations with
the odds of giving birth (Schoen et al. 1999; Barber 2001). Although inaccuracies in
predicting fertility outcomes from fertility intentions have led to questions about the
utility of fertility intentions (Miller and Pasta 1995; Bongaarts 2001), the lack of a
perfect correspondence does not mean that fertility intentions cannot be useful
predictors. Rather, the absence of perfect correspondence provides insights into various
constraints on meeting fertility intentions as well as potential problems with the
measurement of the intentions construct itself (Mumford et al. 2016; Voas 2003).
Questions about fertility intentions remain common in demographic surveys, but
questions about fertility ideals are less common because of perceived problems with the
concept (Philipov and Bernardi 2012). The original question on ideal family size used
in a 1936 Gallop Poll was “What do you think is the ideal number of children for the
average American family?” (Hin et al. 2011: 135). Ryder and Westoff (1971) harshly
criticized this question as lacking face validity. Without a specific point of reference,
respondents do not have guidance about the intention of the question, leaving it unclear
what the concept measures (Blake 1966). Philipov and Bernardi (2012), however, argue
that the concept “fertility ideals” is useful even if the specific measure originally
employed was not. Measures of fertility ideals can provide insights about prevailing
social norms (Basten and Gu 2013; Bacci 2001; De Santis and Bacci 2001). Such
measures can also inform tests of theories of microlevel fertility decision-making
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Basten and Gu 2013; Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 2003;
Rindfuss, Morgan, and Swicegood 1988; Schoen et al. 1999) and aid in the evaluation
of theories of fertility decline (Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 2003; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn
1988; van de Kaa 2001). In addition, factors that influence childbearing ideals may also
be associated with actual fertility (Kohler 2001; van de Kaa 2001).
Measures of the ideal number of children that specify a referent may use a lens of a
societal ideal family size (Goldstein , Lutz, and Testa 2003; Bacci 2001; De Santis and
Bacci 2001). Thus, the Eurobarometer surveys often include the following question:
“Generally speaking, what do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to
have?” When the question is asked in this generic way, the ideal number of children is
assumed to reflect societal norms rather than personal preferences or, as Trent (1980)
puts it, the degree of pronatalism in a society. Understood as a reflection of social
norms, demographers assume that the ideal number of children is relatively stable
(Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 2003; Testa and Grilli 2006). In the United States in recent
decades, the two-child ideal norm (Hagewen and Morgan 2005) contributes to pressure
to conform to this ideal (Morgan and Rackin 2010).

462

http://www.demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 39, Article 16

It is unclear, however, whether individual women consider the societal norm as
applicable to themselves. Because theories of fertility decision-making as well as policy
recommendations often focus on the role of individuals in creating macrolevel change,
it is important to also measure personal fertility ideals; for example, the Eurobarometer
surveys ask, “And for you personally, what would be the ideal number of children you
would like to have or would have liked to have had?” Such a personal ideal number of
children measure is related to fertility desires and is likely to change over time with
changes in attitudes, cognitions, and social circumstances (Philipov and Bernardi 2012).
In the current study, we use social psychological theories of fertility decision-making
(emphasizing desires and intentions) to guide our analyses of personal fertility ideals.

2.2 Theoretical perspectives on personal fertility ideals
There are three major theoretical models of the process of fertility decision-making: the
Traits-Desires-Intentions-Behavior (TDIB) (Miller 1994, 2011), the Theory of Planned
Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen and Klobas 2013; Dommermuth, Klobas, and Lappegård 2011),
and the Cognitive-Social Model (CSM) (Bachrach and Morgan 2013; Johnson-Hanks et
al. 2011; Rackin and Bachrach 2016). These three compatible models have different
emphases. The TDIB model was developed by Miller and his associates in 1994 and
has benefited from several revisions and refinements over the past two decades (Miller
1994, 2011; Miller and Pasta 1995; Miller, Rodgers, and Pasta 2010; Miller, Severy,
and Pasta 2004). The basic model posits that,
…the motivational forces driving the fertility related behaviors of individuals
and couples unfold in a sequential process that begins with nonconscious
motivational dispositions (traits) to have or not have children, which lead to
conscious desires to have children or not, which in turn lead to conscious
intentions to have children or not, which finally lead to the performance of
behaviors that are instrumental in the achievement or avoidance of the
childbearing (Miller 2011: 76).
Miller’s model focuses on childbearing in a way that implies the relevance of, but
does not explicitly measure, overall fertility ideals. In the TDIB model, desires
constitute a conscious wish to have children and mediate between an inchoate trait that
motivates desiring children or not and behaviors and conscious intentions to have
children or not. The TDIB model pays more attention than other theories to underlying
genetically based motivations to have or not have children (Basten and Gu 2013).
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The TPB represents a general approach explaining intentional and reasoned action
(Ajzen 1991, 2005), which has been applied to reproductive decision-making (Ajzen
and Klobas 2013; Dommermuth, Klobas, and Lappegård 2011). TPB conceptualizes
having a child as the result of fertility decision-making based upon intentions and actual
control over having a child. Fertility intentions derive from three factors: attitude
toward having a child, subjective norm for having a child, and perceived control over
having a child. The three factors are shaped by relevant behavioral beliefs about the
costs and benefits of having a child, beliefs about social support for having a child, and
beliefs about factors that might enhance or restrain ability to have a child. Finally,
behavioral beliefs are shaped by individual, demographic, and societal background
factors. In the TPB model, personal fertility ideals are probably unstable and are values
that are part of individual background factors (Philipov and Bernardi 2012). Thus. in
the TPB model, the association of a personal ideal number of children with fertility
intentions is explained by attitudes and behavioral beliefs. The TPB model pays more
attention to underlying cognitive structures of fertility decisions than other theories.
The CSM was developed to address concerns about the overemphasis of the TPB
on intentional action and proximate causes of fertility behavior (Bachrach and Morgan
2013; Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011; Rackin and Bachrach 2016). Based on recent ideas in
cognitive science and social science more generally, the CSM posits that fertility
behavior is the result both of conscious and deliberative intentions and nondeliberative,
emotionally laden, “automatic” cognitions. The CSM posits that cognitions derive from
social structures, which include both material structures and schemas (relatively stable
and abstract representations of the meaning of an object or event) (Bachrach 2014).
Schemas are shaped by background factors, experience, and life-course transitions.
Schemas can change with life experience, such as friends or families having a baby,
increasing or decreasing religiosity, changing job status, changes in media portrayals of
normative family size, or changes in social policy. Of the three models, the CSM is
both less specific about the elements that go into fertility decision-making and more
faithful to the actual ways people think and act (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2015;
Philipov and Bernardi 2012). In the CSM, fertility ideals would probably fit into the
category of schemas insofar as they comprise representations of the meanings of
fertility. More than other models, the CSM draws our attention to such likely sources of
change in fertility ideals as changes in attitudes and resources, personal experiences,
and life course transitions. For this reason, the CSM seems better suited for guiding
research on sources of change and stability in fertility ideals than TDIB and TPB.
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2.3 Values, resources, attitudes, and fertility ideals
Why might fertility ideals vary among women? Hayford (2009) argues that societal
schemas about the ideal number of children will have the strongest association with
fertility ideals. Even in a society with a strong two-child norm, there is evidence that
fertility ideal schemas differ between women (Rackin and Bachrach 2016). Heiland,
Prskawetz, and Sanderson (2008) discuss three sources of between-person differences
in fertility ideals: family background, individual characteristics, and behavioral
dispositions. Growing up in a larger family is associated with a higher ideal number of
children than growing up in a smaller family (Axinn, Clarkberg, and Thornton 1994;
Dey and Wasoff 2010; Gustavus and Nam 1970; Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson
2008; Johnson and Freymeyer 1989). Therefore, family-of-origin experiences can shape
schemas of family size (Basten and Gu 2013; Testa and Grilli 2006). Community
fertility rates can also influence schemas of ideal family size (Goldstein, Lutz, and
Testa 2003; Kohler 2001; Testa and Grilli 2006). Having parents who divorced is also
associated with lower fertility ideals (Axinn and Thornton 1996). We therefore
recognize that early life experiences can shape adult fertility ideals, but we do not have
measures to directly assess these variables in the study dataset.
Stable individual characteristics are also associated with variation in fertility
ideals. In the United States, there is some evidence that African Americans have lower
fertility expectations than do non-Hispanic whites (Rackin and Bachrach 2016). Not all
studies yield consistent results, yet most evidence, primarily from Europe, suggests that
higher levels of education are associated with higher fertility ideals (Dey and Wasoff
2010; Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson 2005; Hin et al. 2011; Miller 1992; Testa and
Grilli 2006). Some of the inconsistency in the association of education and fertility
ideals could reflect differences between lower and higher fertility contexts (JohnsonHanks et al 2011). Higher levels of education are associated with higher fertility ideals,
yet there is some evidence that being in a more prestigious occupation is associated
with lower fertility ideals (Dey and Wasoff 2010). Among women, anticipated labor
force participation is associated with lower fertility ideals (Waite and Stolzenberg
1976). The effect of economic resources and economic hardship on fertility ideals is not
clear; higher incomes may raise ideals (Miller 1994), but an increased emphasis on
quality of offspring may lower fertility ideals. In a Scottish study, Dey and Wasoff
(2010) found higher income to be associated with lower fertility ideals. Social policies
that reduce conflicts between work and childrearing probably influence fertility ideals
for women (Mills et al. 2011).
A number of studies find that attitudes, values, and behavioral dispositions are
associated with fertility ideals (Hin et al. 2011). The idea that women who place a high
value on leisure or career success have lower fertility preferences is implied in some
theories of fertility (e.g., Bongaarts 2001) and explicit in others (e.g., Bachrach and
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Morgan 2011). Preference theory (Hakim, 2003, 2004) and other ideology-based
theories (e.g., Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986) are explicit in stressing the importance
of values for fertility intentions. Hakim (2003) suggests that, of the three groups of
women she identifies (work-focused, home-focused, or combined focus), the workfocused are likely to have the lowest fertility ideals.
Religiosity is also associated with fertility preferences (Koropeckyj-Cox and
Pendell 2007; Pearce 2002). Religious attendance (Adserà 2006; Rackin and Bachrach
2016) and religious affiliation (Adserà 2006; Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson 2008)
are both associated with higher fertility desires. Using European Fertility and Family
Surveys, Philipov and Berghammer (2007) found that higher scores on all religiosity
measures were associated with higher fertility ideals. The effect of religiosity was much
greater for fertility ideals than for fertility intentions. Philipov and Berghammer (2007)
suggested that the effects of religion on fertility ideals were probably due to religious
socialization, norms in religious institutions, higher levels of social capital, and the
reduction of uncertainty that comes with religious beliefs.
It seems reasonable to expect that changes in fertility intentions will be associated
with changes in fertility ideals. Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson (2008) discovered
that women with the normative ideal of two children were less likely to change their
fertility ideals than women with higher or lower fertility ideals. By including a measure
of fertility intentions in our model, we assess whether intentions and ideals merely
capture the same underlying processes (i.e., have very high associations) or if they
capture unique dimensions of fertility experiences. Prior research shows that higher
importance of motherhood is associated with higher intentions (McQuillan et al. 2015),
and therefore is likely to also be associated with higher fertility ideals. Therefore, we
include measures of initial intentions and change in importance of motherhood.

2.4 Sources of change in fertility ideals
Life course theory and empirical evidence suggest that life course and social cues such
as getting married, number of children, or reaching a certain age should also be
associated with changes in fertility preferences (Namboodiri 1983). Ní Bhrolcháin and
Beaujouan’s (2015) Preference Construction Theory holds that people do not actually
have fertility preferences; rather, when they are asked questions about preferences, they
construct their preferences based on current schemas and contemporary circumstances.
Therefore, Preference Construction Theory suggests that fertility ideals are more like
states than stable traits and are susceptible to change.
There is evidence that fertility preferences are shaped in contexts of social
networks and couple relationships (Becker 1999; DeRose, Dodoo, and Patil 2002;

466

http://www.demographic-research.org

Demographic Research: Volume 39, Article 16

Miller, Severy, and Pasta 2004; Thomson 1997; Voas 2003). Therefore, the importance
of children to partners, the importance of children to parents, and having friends have
children are all likely to be associated with fertility ideals. A higher current number of
children (parity) is also likely to be associated with higher fertility ideals (Engelhardt
2004; Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson 2008). Dey and Wasoff (2010) found in a
Scottish sample that those with a fertility ideal of zero were more likely to have no
children. There is evidence that age has a negative association with fertility ideals;
higher ideals among younger people tend to adjust downward with age (Dey and
Wasoff 2010; Liefbroer 2008).
There is some evidence that religion may be associated with changes in fertility
ideal. One study found that Catholic women are more likely to change fertility desires
than women from other religious groups (Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson 2008).
Employment is associated with lower fertility desires (Engelhardt 2004), and there is
also evidence that a spell of unemployment is associated with a decrease in fertility
ideals (Heiland, Prskawetz, and Sanderson 2008). Testa and Grilli (2006) found in a
European study that being enrolled in school was associated with lower fertility ideals
for women but higher fertility ideals for men.

2.5 Statement of problem
In this paper we analyze the initial level of and change in personal fertility ideals among
US women over the course of three years. Rather than assume that fertility ideals
simply mirror cultural norms in a society and are a stable trait (Naboodiri 1983), we
estimate the initial distribution and change in personal fertility ideals over three years.
We estimate associations of individual characteristics, attitudes, and life course cues
with initial fertility ideals and change in those ideals. We focus on five sets of
expectations based upon prior research and the CSM. First, women who have
backgrounds associated with higher fertility rates (religiosity, friends with children) will
have higher fertility ideals, and increases in religiosity or friends with children will be
associated with increases in fertility ideals. Second, women who perceive that parents
or partners want children will have higher fertility ideals or will be less likely to
decrease fertility ideals. Third, women with higher education, full-time employment,
and higher importance of leisure and work will be more likely to decrease their personal
fertility ideals. Fourth, increases in parity or the importance of motherhood will be
associated with higher likelihood of increases in fertility ideals. Finally, more economic
hardship will be associated with a decrease in fertility ideals.
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3. Data and methods
We use both waves of the NSFB (Johnson et al. 2009), a random-digit-dialing (RDD)
telephone survey of 4,712 women of childbearing ages (25 to 45) in Wave 1. Initial
interviews (Wave 1) were conducted between 2004 and 2006. Follow-up interviews
were conducted approximately three years later with all women who could be reached
between 2008 and 2010 (Wave 2). Using Census central office codes, high minority
population areas were oversampled; therefore, we use weighted analyses. Internal
review board approval was obtained from the institutions collecting the data.
Information about the data, and access to the data files for public access can be found
through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
(Johnson 2010).
The estimated response rate for the screener sample is 53%; the response rate for
the completed sample is 37%. Despite relatively low response rates, this sample is
similar to other RDD telephone surveys of the same time period and is mostly
representative of the population based on comparisons with Census data. There is some
overrepresentation of more highly educated women. Wave 2 contains 2,136 women
participants, which is 58% of those that participated in Wave 1. Only 158 (6%) of
women refused to participate in the second interview; others were difficult to recontact
because of the rapid increase in cell-only households and mobility due to the economic
crisis of 2007. The analytic sample consists of women (N = 879) who were interviewed
at both Wave 1 and Wave 2, who reported fertility ideals, and who were part of the
same couple at both time points.

3.1 Concepts and measures
The dependent variable is personal fertility ideal. The question is identical to the
question asked in 1995 in Cycle 5 of the National Survey of Fertility Growth: “The next
question asks about the number of children you consider ideal for yourself. This could
be more or less than you already have or more or less than you expect to have. If you
yourself could choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how
many would you choose?” Participants provided a number from 0 to as high as they
wanted. This question comes near the beginning of the survey (question 12 of about 100
questions) and after questions about the participant’s pregnancy history, desires, and
intentions. Question 10 is about desire for a child (“Would you, yourself, like to have a
baby?”), and if relevant, about one’s partner’s desire for a child (question 10b). The
next questions are about fertility intentions. (Question 11: “I’ve asked what you would
like to do. Now, I want to ask about what you actually intend to do. Do you intend to
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have a baby?”) We did not include both desires and intentions because they are highly
correlated (r = .770) and we wanted to avoid multicollinearity. Fertility ideals, however,
have modest correlations with fertility desires (r = .238) and fertility intentions
(r = .122). Schwarz and Strack (1990) find that survey questions on related concepts
that are asked close together in a survey are easier for participants to differentiate than
questions that are not close together, supporting our argument that fertility ideals may
be considered as distinct from desires and intentions. The response for personal fertility
ideals at Wave 1 is also included in the analyses. To help with floor and ceiling effects,
the variable has been collapsed into three categories (0–1, 2, and 3 or more), with a
personal ideal number of children of two serving as the reference category.
Individual characteristics. Education is a continuous variable that measures the
years of education from 4–22. Following Johnson (2005) and Su (2012), all of the
variables that change over time have two measures: the Wave 1 measure and the change
score (Wave 2–Wave 1) version. Those employed over 35 hours a week were coded as
employed full time, and those working less than 35 hours a week were coded as
employed part time; both groups are compared to the unemployed. We assigned a value
of “3” to employed full time, a value of “2” to employed part time, and a value of “1” to
unemployed. To create our measure of employment status change, we subtracted Wave
1 from Wave 2. Economic hardship is a scale computed by calculating the mean of the
following questions: (1) “During the last 12 months, how often did it happen that you
had trouble paying bills?” (2) “During the last 12 months, how often did it happen that
you did not have enough money to buy food, clothes, or other things your household
needed?” (3) “During the last 12 months, how often did it happen that you did not have
enough money to pay for medical care?” Responses range from never to very often
(coded so that higher values indicate more hardship). The scale is unidimensional with
high reliability ( = .82).
Attitudes. Importance of leisure was measured by the question “How important is
having leisure to enjoy your own interests?” Responses range from not important (1) to
very important (4). Importance of valuing career was measured by the question “How
important is being successful in your line of work?” Religiosity was measured by four
questions: (1) “How often do you attend religious services?” (2) “About how often do
you pray?” (3) “How close do you feel to God most of the time?” (4) “In general, how
much would you say your religious beliefs influence your daily life?” The measures
were coded so that high values indicate higher religiosity, standardized, and combined
into a scale by computing the mean to create a single factor scale (α = .78). Fertility
intentions were measured by two questions: (1) “Do you intend to have a baby?”
(2) “Of course, sometimes things do not work out exactly as we intend them to, or
something makes us change our minds. In your case, how sure are you that you
will/will not have a child?” Responses were coded so that low scores indicate “very
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sure do not intend” (–2) to high scores of “very sure do intend” (+2). Women who
said they “don’t know” their intentions, who said they cannot have children, or who
said they would let God or nature decide are coded 0 (the center of the scale). Four
of the importance of motherhood items have responses ranging from strongly agree to
strongly disagree: (1) “Having children is important to my feeling complete as a
woman.” (2) “I always thought I would be a parent.” (3) “I think my life will be or is
more fulfilling with children.” (4) “It is important for me to have children.” The fifth
variable, (5) “How important is each of the following in your life…raising children?”
has responses ranging from not very important to very important. The measures were
coded so that high values indicate higher importance of motherhood and were combined
into a scale by computing the mean to create a single factor scale (α = .86).
Life course and social cues. Importance to parents is measured by the statement
“It is important to my parents that I have children” (4 = very important). Importance to
partner was measured by the statement “It is important to my partner that we have
children” (4 = very important). Children amongst friends and family was measured by
the question “Thinking about your family and friends, would you say that all, most,
some, few, or none of them have kids?” Changes in parity were computed from a
reproductive history that measured the number of live births and recoded into a series of
dummy variables for always no children, always one child, always three or more
children, became a parent, and added a child. Two children at both waves is the
reference category. Age was measured in years.

3.2 Analytic strategy
To assess within-person change in personal fertility ideals, it is common to use a change
score (Wave 1 scores subtracted from Wave 2 scores) as the dependent variable in an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Allison 1990). One shortcoming of an OLS
approach is that it focuses on means and is therefore unable to detect change when
some individuals increase while others decrease. In such situations, relying on means
leads to the erroneous conclusion that change has not occurred, when in fact people are
changing, but in opposing directions. For this reason, we recoded change scores into
three categories – decreased, stable, or increased – in personal ideal number of children.
Then we used multinomial logistic regression to assess associations between increases
or decreases in fertility ideals, on the one hand, and stability on the other. Using
conditional change scores as independent variables can lead to biased results because of
the failure to consider the correlation between the independent variable measured at
Wave 1 and the corresponding change score variable (Finkel 1995). Therefore, we
included initial and change score versions of the independent variables. We also include
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indicator variables for initial low (0,1) or high (3,3+) compared to the normative
(2) personal fertility ideal to assess whether the initial personal fertility ideal is
associated with the likelihood of increasing, decreasing, or remaining stable. As with
fixed effects and change score models, our multinomial logistic regression includes two
waves of data and thus reduces concern about measurement error and omitted variables
(Johnson 2005; Su 2012).
A frequency distribution of the change score for personal fertility ideals indicated
that 31% changed their personal fertility ideals. Figure 1 shows that, among the women
who change their personal ideal number of children between waves, about half reported
a higher personal ideal number of children at Wave 2, while the other half reported a
lower personal ideal number of children. As noted above, we therefore created a threecategory dependent variable (decreased, stable, or increased) and used multinomial
logistic regression to estimate associations of individual characteristics, attitudes, life
course, and social cues with decreases or increases compared to stable fertility ideals.

Percentage of women

Figure 1:
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Change in personal fertility ideal between waves

69%

12%
0%
-3

12%
4%

3%
-2

-1

0

1

2

0%
3

Change in personal fertility ideal

4. Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. Even with 31% of
women changing fertility ideals, the mean is very similar across waves (2.59 for
Wave 1 and 2.60 in Wave 2), in part because, of those who change, half increase and
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half decrease. The analytic sample consists of women in the same heterosexual
relationship who participated in both waves. The mean level of education (15.80) was
high, most of the women were employed full time, and economic hardship was low,
with little change.
Table 1:

Descriptive statistics of 879 women in the analytical sample from the
National Survey of Fertility Barriers

PFI wave 1
PFI wave 2
Individual characteristics
Education
Employment status
Unemployed
Part-time
Full-time
Employment status Δ
Economic hardship
Economic hardship Δ
Attitudes
Importance of leisure
Importance of leisure Δ
Importance of career
Importance of career Δ
Religiosity
Religiosity Δ
Intentions
Intentions Δ
Importance of motherhood
Importance of motherhood Δ
Life course and social cues
Importance to partner
Importance to partner Δ
Importance to parents
Importance to parents Δ
Friends have kids
Friends have kids Δ
Always zero
Always one
Always two
Always three plus
Became a parent
Added a child
Age

Mean/p

St. Dev.

Min.

Max.

2.59
2.60

1.09
1.09

0
0

4
4

15.74

2.70

4

22

0.25
0.16
0.59
–0.03
1.37
0.04

0.83
0.60
0.58

–2
1
–2.5

2
4
2.5

3.25
–0.02
3.20
0.08
–0.09
–0.00
–0.56
–1.16
3.35
0.01

0.80
0.85
0.85
0.91
1.08
0.47
2.45
2.05
0.71
0.42

1
–3
1
–3
–3.21
–1.54
–3
–6
1
–1.6

4
3
4
3
1.65
1.96
3
6
4
1.58

3.23
–0.05
3.08
–0.00
3.98
0.05
0.18
0.15
0.24
0.14
0.10
0.19
35.35

0.84
0.65
0.79
0.71
0.76
0.78

1
–3
1
–3
1
–3

4
3
4
3
5
4

5.79

25

45

Note: PFI = Personal fertility ideal.

Most women had high and stable importance of leisure and career. There was little
average change in religiosity between waves. Fertility intentions were initially low and
on average decreased between waves. Average importance of motherhood was above
the midpoint of the scale, with little average change between waves. Similarly, mean
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scores for the perceptions of partners’ and parents’ desires were high, as were the
number of friends with children, indicating mostly pronatalist inclinations and
influences. About 20% of the women did not have children, and nearly 40% had two or
more children at both waves. More than a fourth had a child between waves; for about
one-third of this group, this was their first child.
Table 2 provides the results of multinomial logistic regressions showing
associations with decreases and increases compared to stability in personal fertility
ideals. The first set of columns in the table shows relative risk ratios for the odds of
decreasing personal fertility ideals, compared to stability. Values of less than one
indicate decreased odds of decreasing fertility ideals and values more than one indicated
increased odds of decreasing personal fertility ideals relative to remaining stable. The
second set of columns shows the odds of increasing personal fertility ideals relative to
stability.
As we expected, higher initial fertility ideals were associated with higher odds of
decreasing and lower odds of increasing personal fertility ideals compared to
maintaining stable fertility ideals. Women with more education had lower odds of
increasing rather than maintaining their fertility ideals, but women who had more initial
economic hardship had lower odds of decreasing than maintaining fertility ideals.
Women who were employed part time or full time at Wave 1 had higher odds of
decreasing than maintaining stable fertility intentions between waves, relative to
women who were unemployed.
Three of the attitudes measures were also associated with changes in fertility
ideals. Higher initial religiosity, initial fertility intentions, and initial importance of
motherhood were associated with lower odds of decreasing compared to maintaining
stable fertility ideals. Similarly, within-person increases in fertility intentions and
importance of motherhood were associated with lower odds of decreasing rather than
maintaining stable fertility ideals. We found that increases in importance of motherhood
were associated with lower odds of increasing compared to maintaining stable fertility
ideals.
Of the life course and social cues measures, only parity and age were associated
with changes in fertility ideals. Women with one child at both waves had lower odds of
increasing compared to maintaining stable fertility ideals, and women with three or
more children at both waves had lower odds of decreasing fertility ideals compared to
women with two children at both waves. Additionally, women who added a child had
lower odds of decreasing their fertility ideals compared to women who had two children
at both waves. Finally, older women had lower odds of decreasing than maintaining
fertility ideals.
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Table 2:

Multinomial logistic regression of change in personal fertility ideal
compared to stable personal fertility ideal
Decrease in PFI vs. stable
RRR
CI

Increase in PFI vs. stable
RRR
CI

1

Wave I PFI
Wave 1 PFI: 0 or 1
Wave 1 PFI: 3 or more
Individual characteristics
Education
2
Employment status
Part-time
Full-time
Employment status Δ
Economic hardship
Economic hardship Δ
Attitudes
Importance of leisure
Importance of leisure Δ
Importance of career
Importance of career Δ
Religiosity
Religiosity Δ
Intentions
Intentions Δ
Importance of motherhood
Importance of motherhood Δ
Life course and social cues
Importance to partner
Importance to partner Δ
Importance to parents
Importance to parents Δ
Friends have kids
Friends have kids Δ
Initial and Δ in parity
Always zero children
Always one child
Always three plus children
Became a parent
Added a child
Age
N

0.36
17.51 ***

[0.09–1.42]
[8.74–35.1]

6.10 ***
0.32 ***

[2.66–14.0]
[0.19–0.53]

0.96

[0.87–1.06]

0.82 ***

[0.75–0.89]

2.47 *
2.24 *
1.27
0.56 *
0.94

[1.19–5.12]
[1.14–4.39]
[0.92–1.75]
[0.35–0.90]
[0.61–1.46]

1.79
1.55
0.94
0.97
1.19

[0.90–3.57]
[0.84–2.86]
[0.70–1.25]
[0.66–1.41]
[0.82–1.73]

0.67
0.75
1.15
1.20
0.74
1.43
0.72
0.68
0.49
2.46

[0.47–0.95]
[0.54–1.04]
[0.82–1.61]
[0.88–1.64]
[0.59–0.92]
[0.89–2.32]
[0.60–0.87]
[0.58–0.81]
[0.25–0.97]
[1.19–5.08]

1.23
0.95
0.97
0.93
0.91
1.06
1.09
1.04
1.68
0.37 **

[0.87–1.72]
[0.71–1.28]
[0.72–1.31]
[0.71–1.23]
[0.75–1.12]
[0.69–1.62]
[0.93–1.28]
[0.90–1.20]
[0.94–3.02]
[0.19–0.72]

0.74
0.97
0.86
1.16
0.89
1.29

[0.45–1.23]
[0.62–1.53]
[0.59–1.26]
[0.80–1.66]
[0.59–1.33]
[0.88–1.87]

0.93
0.99
1.26
1.22
1.01
1.03

[0.61–1.43]
[0.64–1.52]
[0.89–1.79]
[0.85–1.75]
[0.71–1.42]
[0.76–1.41]

0.62
1.65
0.32 **
0.77
0.27 ***
0.88 ***

[0.23–1.70]
[0.79–3.43]
[0.15–0.67]
[0.27–2.20]
[0.12–0.58]
[0.83–0.93]

0.45
0.42 *
1.16
0.40
1.01
0.98

[0.19–1.11]
[0.20–0.88]
[0.56–2.42]
[0.15–1.05]
[0.47–2.16]
[0.93–1.03]

*

**
***
***
*
*

879

Notes: PFI = Personal fertility ideal; RRR = Exponentiated coefficients; CI = 95% in brackets.
1
2
Wave I PFI of 2 is the reference category. Unemployed is the reference category. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

5. Conclusion
Among women of reproductive age in stable heterosexual relationships over about three
years, most (69%) had stable fertility ideals. A substantial minority (31%) of women,
however, changed fertility ideals, with equal proportions increasing or decreasing their
personal ideal number of children. Therefore, personal fertility ideals do change over
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approximately three years for a substantial minority of women, and they increase for
some women and decrease for other women. This pattern could not easily be discerned
using OLS regression.
We outlined five expectations about the relationships between independent
variables and changes in fertility ideals. First, we expected that women who have
backgrounds associated with higher fertility rates (religiosity, friends with children)
would have higher fertility ideals and that increases in religiosity or friends with
children would be associated with increases in fertility ideals. Higher initial religiosity
was associated with lower odds of decreasing fertility ideals, but, contrary to
expectations, changes in religiosity were not associated with changes in fertility ideals.
Also contrary to our first set of expectations, changes in friends with children were not
associated with changes in fertility ideals. Therefore, we do not find support for the idea
that fertility changes among friends shape fertility ideals. Initial religiosity is related to
the stability of the personal ideal number of children. It is possible that three years is
not a sufficient time frame to allow for changes in friends, family, and religiosity to
occur or to shape fertility ideals.
Our second expectation was that women who perceive that parents or partners
want children would have higher fertility ideals and would be less likely to decrease
fertility ideals. In contrast to this second set of expectations, we did not find that the
perception of parents or partners wanting the participant to have children was associated
with changes in fertility ideals. This finding is not consistent with expectations of the
social cognitive model of fertility intentions. This inconsistency may be because of the
relatively short interval between waves (≤ 3 years) or because the times at which an
individual is most susceptible to these social cues may come earlier in their lives.
Future research would benefit from data that has measures of family of origin
experiences (e.g., number of siblings, parental divorce) and that follows women over
more time.
Our third set of expectations was that women with higher education, full time
employment, and higher importance of leisure and work would be more likely to
decrease their personal fertility ideals. We found partial support for our third set of
expectations. Higher education was associated with lower likelihood of increasing
fertility ideals. In addition, full-time employment at the initial interview was associated
with higher likelihood of decreasing fertility ideals. Higher importance of leisure and
higher importance of career, however, are not associated with decreases in fertility
ideals. These findings indicate that actual time constraints, rather than perceived
importance and priority of behaviors, may lead to downward adjustments (or lower
likelihood of upward adjustment) of personal fertility ideals. Individuals seem to be
reacting to the demands of their schedules. Their personal preferences regarding their
career and leisure are more stable and were used to shape initial fertility ideals.
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Our fourth set of expectations was that increases in parity or the importance of
motherhood would be associated with higher likelihood of increases in fertility ideals.
Consistent with the fourth set of expectations, parity and importance of motherhood are
associated with changes in fertility ideals. Our expectations focused on changes in
parity, but we found that women who had one child at both waves were less likely to
increase fertility ideals and that women who stayed at three or more children were less
likely to decrease fertility ideals. The addition of a child, but not of a first child, was
associated with decreased odds of decreasing one’s fertility ideals.
We were unsure whether higher importance of motherhood would be associated
with higher or lower fertility ideals because women with higher importance of
motherhood might want more children, or else might want to invest more in fewer
children. In this study, women with higher initial importance of motherhood were less
likely to decrease fertility ideals than remain stable, and women who increased
importance of motherhood were less likely to decrease or increase fertility ideals than to
remain stable. This finding may be tapping into contradictory processes. First, women
may experience an increase in their importance of motherhood but in turn decrease their
personal fertility ideal because they wish to invest more resources into each child rather
than have a higher number of children (Morgan and King 2001). Alternatively, women
may increase their importance of motherhood and then yearn for more children to help
satisfy this increase in their mothering desires.
Finally, we expected that increases in economic hardship would be associated with
a decrease in fertility ideals. We did not find that changes in economic hardship were
associated with changes in fertility ideals. This stability must be interpreted in terms of
the mixed findings on how economic hardship and income are related to fertility (Dey
and Wasoff 2010; Miller 1994). We did find, however, that women with higher initial
economic hardship were less likely to decrease than to have stable fertility ideals. This
stability may be related to other evidence showing that, in lower socioeconomic
statuses, a sense of achievement and success may be derived from having children
(Edin and Kefalas 2011).
As with all studies, this study has some limitations. First, we have looked at
change over a relatively short time span only. We took advantage of existing data for
this study; we have no rationale for determining the ideal time span over which to
assess change in the personal ideal number of children. In addition, we had access to
only two waves of data. It would be ideal to follow women from the beginning to the
end of reproductive years to assess the degree of stability or revision in fertility ideals.
Furthermore, some of our independent variables did not change much over a three-year
period, thus making it impossible to determine whether change in these variables would
be associated with changes in ideals. Another limitation is that we did not have access
to such background characteristics as number of siblings, community norms, and
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changes in relationship status that previous research and theory suggest should be
related to change in personal fertility ideals. Reporting a fertility ideal that is less than
one’s current number of children could be seen as taboo, and therefore may be
associated with some social desirability bias. Less than 3% of participants report a
lower ideal than their current number of children. Much of the research on fertility
ideals has focused on European countries; therefore, it is challenging to compare our
findings to prior work. Nonetheless, we add insights to fertility ideals research from the
US context. Future research will benefit from including men and/or conducting couple
analyses to determine the relevance of gender for fertility ideals.
Even with these limitations, our findings that some women change personal
fertility ideals, that personal fertility ideals are related to but unique from desires and
intentions, and that several characteristics are associated with changes in fertility ideals
reveal the value of this line of inquiry. Even though many people in the United States
adopt the contemporary cultural two-child norm, the realities of raising children in a
society with few supports for employed parents may curtail the realization of personal
fertility ideals. Future research that includes younger women, that includes men, that
measures partner influences on personal as opposed to general fertility ideals, and that
compares people who do and do not meet their fertility ideals on psychosocial outcomes
would be worthwhile. The findings will advance theories that attempt to explain fertility
behavior and policies that are designed to ensure that (1) all children are born wanted
and that (2) individuals and couples can meet fertility goals. Additionally, further work
should be done internationally to better understand how this process may function
differently based on varying normative parity climates. For countries such as Japan and
Germany that have subreplacement fertility levels (Billari and Kohler 2004; Boling
2008), or sub-Saharan African countries that have fertility rates that far exceed
replacement (Bongaarts and Casterline 2013), the malleability of an individual’s ideal
number of children may present as an important point for intervention.
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